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There can be little doubt about the ruling for which theSupreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term will best be remem-bered. In its penultimate public session—and over four
fierce dissenting opinions—the Court struck down all remain-
ing state bans on same-sex marriage, thereby simultaneously
setting in place an enormous milestone in the legal rights of
America’s gays and lesbians and, for the ruling’s opponents,
raising the specter of Lochner and judicial illegitimacy. We will
begin by briefly revisiting that landmark ruling and then will
turn to the Term’s other significant decisions, concerning
issues involving administrative law, antitrust, due process,
elections and redistricting, employment discrimination, evi-
dence, executive power, fair housing, federal jurisdiction,
health care, religion, speech, takings, taxation, and more. 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
It is inconceivable that this Term summary will be the first
to carry the news to anyone that, in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment grants
same-sex couples the right to marry and to have their mar-
riages recognized in all states. Joined by the Court’s four
Democratic appointees, Justice Kennedy found that “the right
to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”2 With
respect to the equal-protection claim, the Court did not settle
upon a standard of review for sexual-orientation classifications
but did twice say that sexual orientation is an immutable
trait—a finding that likely helps to lay the groundwork for
finding heightened scrutiny appropriate in a future case. The
Court’s four other Republican appointees each filed dissenting
opinions excoriating the majority for, in their view, ignoring
the limits of the Constitution and of the judicial role and halt-
ing midstream a dynamic public debate about the marital
rights of same-sex couples.
Given the ruling’s familiarity among all readers, a novel
approach to summarizing the majority and principal dissent-
ing opinions seems in order. Here, then, are simply words and
phrases from those two texts. Taken together, these snippets
nicely capture the stark disagreements that so sharply divided
the Court.
From Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority (with quo-
tation marks omitted): Identity. Profound hopes and aspira-
tions. Centrality. Immutable nature. Fundamental. Individual
dignity and autonomy. A lonely person might call out only to
find no one there. Loving and nurturing. Keystone of our
social order. Demeans gays and lesbians. Stigma and injury.
Disparage their choices and diminish their personhood. Disre-
spect and subordinate. Urgency. Substantial and continuing
harm.
From the principal dissent, written by Chief Justice Roberts
(with quotation marks again omitted): Not a legislature. Gov-
ernment of laws, not of men. Stealing this issue from the peo-
ple. Dramatic social change. Act of will, not legal judgment.
Just who do we think we are? If I were a legislator. Indefensi-
ble as a matter of constitutional law. Dred Scott. Aggressive
application of substantive due process. Breaks sharply from
decades of precedent. Marriage as traditionally defined.
Lochner. Exalts the role of the judiciary. Celebrate. But [the
Constitution] had nothing to do with it.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
For nearly 20 years, following its decision in Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,3 the District of Columbia
Circuit had held that, although the Administrative Procedure
Act does not require notice-and-comment procedures when an
agency issues a rule interpreting one of its own regulations,4
such procedures are required when an agency wishes to replace
one of its existing interpretations with a new interpretation
that is significantly different. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation,5 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Para-
lyzed Veterans doctrine, finding it inconsistent with the APA’s
plain language.6 When poised to withdraw an earlier regula-
tory interpretation concerning whether mortgage-loan officers
are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, therefore, the
Department of Labor was not required to provide the public
with notice or an opportunity to comment.
Perhaps even more importantly, a few justices used the case
as an opportunity to signal—for the second time in three
years—that major changes may be coming to this area of the
law. Two terms ago, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center,7 Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion casting
doubt on Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.8 and Auer v. Rob-
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bins,9 the two leading cases calling for judicial deference to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito filed a short opinion in Decker, say-
ing that Justice Scalia had raised important issues for determi-
nation in a future case. Here in Mortgage Bankers Association,
Justice Scalia filed another opinion reiterating his concerns,10
Justice Thomas argued at length that Seminole Rock and Auer
raise separation-of-powers problems,11 and Justice Alito filed
an opinion stating that Justices Scalia and Thomas had
“offer[ed] substantial reasons why” the deference prescribed
by those cases “may be incorrect” and declaring that these
issues should be “explored through full briefing and argu-
ment” in a future case.12 An invitation has plainly been issued.
An even more familiar form of deference—deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.13
to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions—also drew the justices’ atten-
tion this Term. As noted under the Health Care heading below,
the Court in King v. Burwell14 found Chevron deference categor-
ically inappropriate in the Term’s major ruling on the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, in large part because the
“extraordinary case” involved the expenditure of billions of dol-
lars and the health care of millions of people and thus wasn’t
likely regarded by Congress as an appropriate occasion for
deferring to the Internal Revenue Service. In its ruling handed
down several days later in Michigan v. EPA,15 the Court applied
the Chevron framework but found deference to the EPA inap-
propriate, concluding that the agency’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act was unreasonable. Potentially even more signifi-
cant in that case was Justice Thomas’s concurrence, in which he
suggested that the entire Chevron-deference regime might be
unconstitutional under separation-of-powers principles.
ANTITRUST
If you live in North Carolina and are interested in whiten-
ing your teeth, North Carolina’s dentists are eager—perhaps a
bit too eager, it turns out—to win your business. Beginning in
2006, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, on
which many practicing dentists sit, began sending cease-and-
desist letters to non-dentists who were offering teeth-whiten-
ing services. The Board contended that those non-dentists
were engaged in the unlicensed practice of dentistry. When the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged the Board with anti-
competitive conduct, the Board sought the shelter of state-
action immunity. 
The Supreme Court ruled against the Board in North Car-
olina State Board of Dental Exam-
iners v. FTC.16 Writing for a six-
member majority, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that the
nation’s antitrust laws “confer
immunity on anticompetitive
conduct by the States when act-
ing in their sovereign capac-
ity.”17 Yet the dentist-laden
Board was not entitled to that
immunity here, Justice Kennedy
explained, because its actions
against non-dentists had not
been supervised by the State
itself and thus State officials
were not politically accountable
for the Board’s anticompetitive
actions. Absent such political accountability, the Court rea-
soned, there was too great a risk that the Board’s dentists would
restrain trade to advance their private interests. Joined in dis-
sent by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito argued that the
majority’s holding was contrary to the Court’s precedent, was in
tension with principles of federalism, and would create confu-
sion about what, precisely, a state must do in order to ensure
that a given agency can successfully claim immunity.
DUE PROCESS
In Kerry v. Din,18 Fauzia Din—an American citizen whose
spouse formerly worked in Afghanistan’s Taliban regime—
claimed a violation of her Fifth Amendment procedural-due-
process rights. The State Department had denied her husband’s
visa application and, when it did so, provided no statement of
reasons beyond citing the federal statute that withholds visas
from persons who have engaged in terrorist activities. A frac-
tured Court rejected Din’s claim that, on the strength of a lib-
erty interest in living with her husband in the United States,
she was entitled to a more complete explanation of the gov-
ernment’s reasons.
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
concluded that Din did not have any constitutionally protected
liberty interest at stake, finding Din’s assertion to the contrary
“absurd” under the original meaning of the Due Process
Clause.19 Justices Kennedy and Alito found that, even if Din did
have a protected liberty interest, she had received all of the
process she was owed when the State Department cited the ter-
rorism statute. Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
9. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
10. See Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (“The agency is free to interpret its own reg-
ulations with or without notice or comment; but courts will
decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that interpre-
tation is correct.”).
11. See id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Because this doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to
an executive agency, it raises constitutional concerns. This line of
precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to pre-
cisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”).
12. Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
15. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
16. 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
17. Id. at 1110 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
18. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
19. Id. at 2133 (plurality op.).
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24. Id. at 2657.
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while Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.
30. Id. at 2033.
31. Id. at 2032.
32. 42 U.S.C. ¶ 2000e-5(b).
33. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
34. Id. at 1653-54.
Kagan, Justice Breyer dissented,
concluding that spouses have a
liberty interest in living together
and that “[t]he generality of the
statutory provision cited and the
lack of factual support mean that
here, the reason given is analo-
gous to telling a criminal defen-
dant only that he is accused of
‘breaking the law.’”20
ELECTIONS AND 
REDISTRICTING
Led by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Court held in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission21 that
the Elections Clause does not bar Arizona voters from using that
state’s initiative process to shift from the legislature to an inde-
pendent commission the task of drawing federal congressional
districts. The Elections Clause states that “[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .”22 The Arizona Legislature argued that, in light
of that clause’s use of the phrase “the Legislature thereof,” it had
the sole power to draw the state’s districts for congressional elec-
tions. While concluding that the legislature did have standing to
bring that claim (because it was “an institutional plaintiff assert-
ing an institutional injury, and it commenced this action after
authorizing votes in both of its chambers”23), the Court rejected
the legislature’s claim on the merits. The Court concluded that
the term “legislature” often refers broadly to the law-making
power (rather than, more narrowly, to an elected representative
body), and that the term carries that broader meaning in the
Elections Clause. The clause’s main purpose, the Court said,
“was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not
to restrict the way States enact legislation.”24 Even if the nation’s
founders did not foresee that citizens in some states would one
day make heavy use of initiatives as a law-making method, Jus-
tice Ginsburg said, “the invention of the initiative was in full
harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the
font of governmental power.”25
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, arguing
that the majority had failed to “explain how a constitutional
provision that vests redistricting authority in ‘the Legislature’
permits a State to wholly exclude ‘the Legislature’ from redis-
tricting.”26 If the term “legislature” really were as capacious as
the majority found, the Chief Justice argued by way of exam-
ple, there would have been no need for the Seventeenth
Amendment, which transferred the Senator-selecting power
from “the Legislature” of each state to “the people thereof.”27
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
ACCOMMODATION
Frequenters of American shopping malls know that Aber-
crombie & Fitch operates a chain of music-pumping, sexual-
ity-celebrating clothing stores for the younger set. Until just
this year, Abercrombie applied a strict “Look Policy” to its
employees while they were on the job, regulating their cloth-
ing, hair color, nail length, piercings, and more. Samantha
Elauf, a practicing Muslim, alleged that she was denied a job at
an Abercrombie store because she wore a headscarf; “caps”
were among the things the policy banned, and Elauf wore a
headscarf to her interview. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) filed a Title VII suit on her behalf,
alleging that Abercrombie had discriminated against her
because of her religion.28 A jury returned a verdict in Elauf’s
favor, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that Abercrombie
could not be held liable because Elauf had not told Abercrom-
bie that she would require a religious accommodation.
Led by Justice Scalia, the Court reversed in EEOC v. Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.29 Distinguishing between motives
and knowledge, the Court explained that “an employer who
acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate
Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated sus-
picion that accommodation would be needed.”30 The Court
found that Elauf could prevail merely by showing that her
“need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in [Aber-
crombie’s] decision.”31
CONCILIATION
If the EEOC finds there is “reasonable cause” to believe that
a complainant’s employer has violated Title VII, the agency is
statutorily obliged to “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion.”32 In Mach Mining, LLC v.
EEOC,33 the Court unanimously ruled that courts may review
the EEOC’s compliance with that conciliation-seeking require-
ment but that the scope of the review is narrow. The Court
rejected Mach Mining’s argument that courts should “do a deep
dive into the conciliation process” akin to courts’ immersive
involvement in supervising employers’ and unions’ statutory
duty to negotiate with one another in good faith.34 Rather, Jus-
tice Kagan explained, a court only has the power to satisfy itself
(on the strength of an EEOC affidavit or otherwise) that the
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43. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
44. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (emphasis added).
45. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
46. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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agency has notified the employer of the plaintiffs’ allegations
and has given the employer some form of “opportunity to dis-
cuss the matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance.”35
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adopting the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, which says two things: that discrimi-
nation based upon pregnancy is a form of forbidden sex-based
discrimination and that an employer must treat “women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . the
same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”36
In Young v. United Parcel Service,37 the Court took up the mean-
ing of the latter provision. Peggy Young alleged that her
employer, United Parcel Service, violated the Act’s second provi-
sion by refusing to accommodate her temporary, pregnancy-cre-
ated inability to lift heavy objects, while nevertheless accommo-
dating certain other (albeit not all) classes of employees who
were temporarily unable to work. Led by Justice Breyer, a
divided Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had erred when it
affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for UPS.
When a plaintiff brings a disparate-treatment claim alleging
intentional discrimination based upon the plaintiff’s status as a
pregnant woman, the Court said, she may rely upon McDonnell
Douglas’s familiar, three-phase burden-shifting framework.38
That is, the plaintiff may first try to present evidence sufficient
to support a prima facie claim of intentional pregnancy-based
discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds on that score, the
employer may then offer nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions. The plaintiff can then try to prove that the employer’s
explanation is merely a pretext for forbidden discrimination.
When trying to demonstrate pretext, the Court said, a plaintiff
may argue that “the employer’s policies impose a significant bur-
den on pregnant workers,” that the employer’s proffered ratio-
nale for its actions is “not sufficiently strong to justify the bur-
den,” and that an inference of intentional justification is thus
appropriate.39 Here, the majority found that Young had created
an issue of material fact on the first of those three phases of
analysis and so remanded for further proceedings.40
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas in dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that, under the Act, Young was entitled to—and
had received—“accommodations on the same terms as other
workers with disabling conditions.”41 By injecting a discussion
of “significant burden[s]” and “sufficiently strong” justifications
into the analytic framework for disparate-treatment claims, Jus-
tice Scalia said, the Court had strayed far from the text of the
statute and had muddied Title VII’s distinction between 
disparate-treatment claims and claims alleging disparate
impact.42
EVIDENCE
In Warger v. Shauers,43 the
Court rejected a plaintiff’s effort
to secure a new trial based upon
alleged juror misconduct. After a
jury ruled in favor of the defen-
dant in a personal-injury case,
one of the jurors provided the
plaintiff with an affidavit indicat-
ing that, during the jury’s deliber-
ations, another juror had made
statements which, if true, indi-
cated that she might have lied
during voir dire. Based upon that
account of the jury’s delibera-
tions, the plaintiff sought a new
trial, but the Court ruled the evidence inadmissible. Rule
606(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that,
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . , a juror may
not testify about any statement made . . . during the jury’s delib-
erations . . . .”44 The Court found that entertaining the plaintiff’s
motion for a new trial would entail just such an inquiry.
EXECUTIVE POWER & PASSPORTS
Virtually all readers will recall Justice Jackson’s famous
admonition that the President’s powers are at their “lowest ebb”
when he acts contrary to the will of Congress.45 In Zivotofsky v.
Kerry,46 we saw that, even when the President’s powers are at
low tide, they can still be sufficient to deliver him a victory.
The case concerned Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky’s
desire to have Israel listed as his place of birth both on his pass-
port and on the consular report of his birth abroad. A 2002 fed-
eral statute purported to give him precisely that right. Because
Zivotofsky had been born in Jerusalem, however, the State
Department declined his request, in keeping with the Execu-
tive Branch’s long-standing refusal to acknowledge any single
country’s sovereignty over that coveted and contested city.
With Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court found
that Congress could not compel the State Department to satisfy
Zivotofsky’s request. Justice Kennedy explained that, by direct-
ing the President to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers,”47 the Constitution gives the President the “recogni-
tion power”—the power to decide whether the United States
recognizes a given entity as a legitimate state. Based upon that
text, together with historical practices, prior Court rulings,
and the practical need for the nation to speak with one voice
on such matters, the Court held that the President has the
exclusive “power to recognize or decline to recognize a foreign
state and its territorial bounds.”48 By trying to compel the State
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Department to issue statements
that contradict the President’s
own recognition judgments
about Jerusalem, the Court
said, Congress was illegiti-
mately trying to exercise the
recognition power for itself.
Justice Thomas concurred
in part and dissented in part,
distinguishing between pass-
ports and consular reports of
births abroad. He concluded
that none of Congress’s enu-
merated powers authorizes it
to demand that Israel be listed
as a Jerusalem-born American
citizen’s place of birth on his or
her passport but that Congress could control such matters on
consular reports of births abroad pursuant to its powers under
the Naturalization Clause.49 Justice Scalia dissented, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Alito. He rejected the majority’s
finding that the President’s powers in this area are exclusive,
arguing that the statute on which Zivotofsky relied had noth-
ing to do with formally recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over
Jerusalem, that the statute was a permissible exercise of the
Naturalization Clause, and that the majority was facilitating
tyranny by allowing the President to claim sole control over
foreign-sovereignty issues.
FAIR HOUSING ACT
In one of the Term’s most closely watched cases among civil-
rights activists, the Court ruled 5-4 in Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc.,50 that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) permits disparate-
impact claims, such that a person or entity may be liable under
the statute even in the absence of discriminatory intent. The
FHA declares, among other things, that it is impermissible to
“refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable . . . a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.”51 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy zeroed in on the “otherwise make unavail-
able” language and found that, with that phrasing, Congress
was targeting “the consequences of an action rather than the
actor’s intent.”52 The Court relied heavily upon its reading of
Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.53 and on the fact that,
when amending the FHA in 1988, Congress took no steps to
reject the rulings of nine different circuit courts of appeals that
the FHA permits disparate-impact claims. Justice Kennedy
emphasized, however, that disparate-impact claims should be
allowed only under limited circumstances, such as when gov-
ernment officials cannot identify “valid interest[s] served by
their policies.”54
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, Justice Alito wrote the principal dissent, arguing that
the phrase “because of” in the statutory language quoted above
requires the presence of discriminatory motive or intent. He
further contended that Griggs is far from a model of admirable
statutory interpretation and that the Court’s ruling threatened
to make it more difficult for government officials to take steps
aimed at providing acceptable housing for their poorest resi-
dents, lest those steps (such as rodent-infestation treatment)
drive up the cost of housing and thereby make that housing
less affordable for racial minorities.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
In a brief per curiam reversal of the Fifth Circuit, the Court
ruled in Johnson v. City of Shelby55 that it was error to enter
summary judgment for the municipal defendant when the
plaintiffs failed to declare explicitly in their complaint that
they were making their claims under Section 1983. A plaintiff
“must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has sub-
stantive plausibility,” the Court explained, but “no heightened
pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations
of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to
state a claim.”56
REMOVAL AND THE AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY
REQUIREMENT
Over the dissent of four justices who believed the issue was
not properly before them, the Court ruled in Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co. v. Owens57 that, when a defendant attempts
to remove a case to federal court on diversity-jurisdiction
grounds, the notice of removal need not contain evidence sub-
stantiating the defendant’s good-faith allegation that the
amount-in-controversy requirement is met. Rather, the defen-
dant must submit supporting evidence only if the plaintiff or
the court subsequently challenges that allegation.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND
EX PARTE YOUNG 
Dividing 5-4, the Court ruled in Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Center, Inc.,58 that neither the Supremacy Clause nor the
principles of equity famously illustrated by Ex parte Young59
enable health-care providers to sue for an injunction that
would force a state to comply with Section 30(A) of the Med-
icaid Act. Section 30(A) requires a state “to assure that [Med-
icaid] payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to
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the extent that such care and services are available to the gen-
eral population in the geographic area.”60 Providers of habita-
tion services in Idaho filed a lawsuit alleging that the state’s
reimbursement rates were lower than Section 30(A) permits.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Supremacy Clause supplied the
providers with a cause of action for an injunction compelling
the state to increase its rates, but the Supreme Court reversed.
All nine members of the Court agreed that the Supremacy
Clause does not itself create causes of action but instead
merely “instructs courts what to do when state and federal law
clash.”61 The Court divided 5-4, however, on whether relief
was available under principles of equity and Ex parte Young.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Scalia found that
two aspects of the Medicaid Act signaled Congress’s desire to
foreclose private enforcement of Section 30(A): Congress’s
decision to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to withhold Medicaid funds from a state that violates Sec-
tion 30(A) and the “judicially unadministrable,” “judgment-
laden . . . complexity” of Section 30(A)’s requirements.62 Writ-
ing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that Congress
surely anticipated that equitable relief would be available, that
the remedy of withholding Medicaid funds was far too heavy-
handed to be plausibly regarded by Congress as an effective
lone remedy, and that the ease with which the majority deemed
equitable relief precluded “threatens the vitality of our Ex parte
Young jurisprudence.”63
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, ARTICLE III, AND CONSENT
In its ruling four years ago in Stern v. Marshall,64 the Court
held that Article III does not permit a bankruptcy judge to
issue a final judgment on a state common-law claim that “is in
no way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law.”65
The issues last Term in Wellness International Network v.
Sharif66 were whether a creditor’s particular claim amounted to
a Stern claim and, if it did, whether Stern’s constitutional bar
still stood if the parties consented to the bankruptcy court’s
adjudication of the claim. Wellness (the creditor) sought a
bankruptcy court’s declaration that a trust the debtor adminis-
tered was actually the debtor’s alter ego and that the trust’s
assets should therefore be treated as part of the debtor’s estate.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, the Court ruled 6-3 that, even if the
claim was indeed “a Stern claim” (an issue the majority
declined to reach), the bankruptcy court could take jurisdic-
tion of it. Because “Article III courts retain supervisory author-
ity” over proceedings in bankruptcy courts, the Court said,
“allowing bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III
adjudication of Stern claims does
not usurp the constitutional pre-
rogatives of Article III courts.”67
Writing the principal dissent,68
Chief Justice Roberts—the
author of Stern—argued that
Wellness’s claim was not a Stern
claim and that the bankruptcy
court should be allowed to take
jurisdiction of the claim on those
narrow grounds. By finding that
the parties’ consent empowers a
bankruptcy court to take juris-
diction of a claim that is indeed a
Stern claim, the Chief Justice
argued, the Court was deviating from Article III’s requirements
and was setting a precedent that invites further “erosion of
[Article III courts’] constitutional power.”69
EQUITABLE TOLLING 
In United States v. Wong,70 the Court ruled 5-4 that the two
limitations periods set out in the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)—the two-year period for seeking administrative review
and the six-month period for seeking judicial review—are sub-
ject to equitable tolling. Relying heavily upon the Court’s 1990
decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,71 Justice
Kagan reasoned that there is a strong yet rebuttable presumption
that statutory limitations periods may be equitably tolled, and
she found no persuasive evidence that Congress had intended to
exempt the FTCA’s time bars from such adjustment. The Gov-
ernment’s primary argument had been that the FTCA’s limita-
tions periods were jurisdictional and thus beyond courts’ power
to disregard. The Solicitor General pointed out, for example,
that Congress framed those time bars in emphatic language, stat-
ing that a claim “shall be forever barred” if the statute’s deadlines
are not met.72 The majority found the statute’s language unre-
markable. Instead, the Court focused on Congress’s decision not
to “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the juris-
diction of the district courts”73 when describing the limitations
periods and on Congress’s physical separation of the provisions
concerning the filing deadlines and district courts’ jurisdiction
to hear FTCA claims.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito argued that “[t]he
statutory text, its historical roots, and more than a century of
precedents show that [the FTCA’s] absolute bar is not subject
to equitable tolling.”74 Pointing to the statute’s unqualified lan-
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guage, for example, Justice
Alito wrote that “it is beyond
me how Irwin’s judge-made
presumption announced in
1990 can trump the obvious
meaning of a statute enacted
many decades earlier.”75
PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT
In a major victory for the
Obama Administration, the
Court in King v. Burwell76
rejected a potentially eviscer-
ating attack that had been
brought against the Patient
Protection and Affordable
Care Act. In one of that legis-
lation’s previously obscure
provisions—Section 36B—Congress had adopted language
declaring that taxpayers purchasing health-insurance policies
would be eligible for certain federal tax credits only if they pur-
chased their insurance on “an Exchange established by the
State.”77 Only 16 states had established their own health-insur-
ance exchanges under the legislation, however, leaving the fed-
eral government to establish the exchanges in the other 34.
The Internal Revenue Service had interpreted the statute as
authorizing tax credits in all states, regardless of which sover-
eign had established the exchanges.
By a vote of 6-3, and in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
the Court ruled that tax credits are indeed available for policies
purchased on all exchanges, regardless of whether the state or
the federal government set them up. The Court declined to
defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation, finding
that with “billions of dollars” and the healthcare of “millions
of people” at stake, this was an “extraordinary case” in which
Chevron deference was inappropriate.78 The Chief Justice also
conceded that Section 36B’s plain language appeared to sup-
port the challengers’ interpretation. The Court nevertheless
found that other portions of the statute rendered the “estab-
lished by the State” language ambiguous. Moreover, when con-
sidering the legislation’s overarching goals, the Court found it
implausible that Congress would have wanted to deny tax
credits in those states in which the federal government had
established the exchanges. Without federal tax credits in those
states, far fewer individuals would have been able (and
required) to purchase health insurance, thus keeping many
healthy premium payers out of the insurance pool—and with
those healthy individuals on the sidelines, the costs of cover-
age would have risen even higher, thereby making coverage
financially accessible to even fewer people and putting the
whole system into “a death spiral.”79
Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito in
dissent. He argued that “[w]ords no longer have meaning if an
Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by
the State’”80 and that, just as he believed it had three years ear-
lier in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,81
the Court was abandoning standard principles of statutory
interpretation just for the sake of upholding legislation it
favored.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The unanimity that eluded the Court in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.82—the high-profile religious-freedom ruling
that came down at the end of the 2013-2014 Term—proved
achievable this year in Holt v. Hobbs.83 Led by Justice Alito, the
undivided Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Cor-
rections had violated the statutory religious-freedom rights of
Gregory Holt, a Muslim inmate. Holt wanted to grow a half-
inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs, but prison
officials refused, citing security concerns. The Court held that,
contrary to the demands of the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Arkansas was substantially
burdening Holt’s religious practice without a powerful justifi-
cation for doing so. With respect to Arkansas’s suggestion that
Holt could successfully conceal contraband in a half-inch
beard, for example, the Court believed that prison guards
could search Holt’s proposed beard as readily as they could
search the top of a prisoner’s hirsute head.
RESTATEMENTS
One might sensibly ask why “Restatements” appears as a
heading in a Term summary of this sort. Here’s the answer. In
Kansas v. Nebraska,84 the Court adopted a Special Master’s rec-
ommendations for resolving a water dispute between Kansas
and Nebraska. Of broadest interest to judges, practitioners,
and scholars will be Justice Scalia’s skeptical remarks regarding
the law-defining value of Restatements. In a separate, one-
paragraph opinion, he wrote:
[M]odern Restatements . . . are of questionable value
and must be used with caution. The object of the origi-
nal Restatements was “to present an orderly statement of
the general common law.” Over time, the Restatements’
authors have abandoned the mission of describing the
law, and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations
for what the law ought to be. . . . Restatement sections
[that aim to extend the law in one direction or another]
should be given no weight whatsoever as to the current
state of the law, and no more weight regarding what the
law ought to be than the recommendations of any
respected lawyer or scholar. And it cannot safely be
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assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement
provision describes rather than revises current law.85
SPEECH
The Term produced three noteworthy free-speech rulings:
one on judges’ campaign speech, one on specialty license
plates, and one on local sign ordinances.
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,86 the case concerning
judges’ campaign speech, the 5-4 Court handed down a rare
defeat for a speaker who found herself on the receiving end of
a content-based speech restriction. Florida is among the 39
states that select at least some of their judges through popular
elections, and is among the 30 states that—in keeping with the
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct—
do not allow judicial candidates to personally solicit campaign
funds. Lanell Williams-Yulee, who was seeking a seat on a
Florida county court, sent local voters a letter seeking cam-
paign contributions. The Florida Bar successfully brought
ethics charges against her.
Everyone agreed that Florida was discriminating against
Williams-Yulee’s speech because of its content. For seven jus-
tices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
on one side, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
on the other—that meant strict scrutiny was in order. (Joined
by Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to argue
that states should have “substantial latitude” to limit the role
of money in judicial elections.87 These two justices joined the
rest of the Chief Justice’s opinion.) Led by Chief Justice
Roberts, the majority concluded that this was “one of the rare
cases in which a speech restriction” could survive that
demanding analysis.88 The Court first found that Florida had a
“compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary.” Recent campaign-finance cases in
which the Court took a narrower view of the government’s
compelling interests were inapposite, the Chief Justice said,
because those cases concerned politicians, rather than judges
who are obliged to pay no regard to the preferences of their
supporters.
Turning to the issue that most sharply divided the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts then concluded that the law was narrowly
tailored. Florida’s regulation of judicial candidates’ speech was
admittedly underinclusive, he said, insofar as the state allowed
judges’ campaign committees to solicit contributions and
allowed judges to send thank-you notes to donors. In an espe-
cially important passage, however, the majority found that
underinclusiveness is not itself a freestanding problem in free-
speech cases. Rather, underinclusiveness becomes problematic
when it signals that the government is not actually pursuing the
objective it has declared or when it indicates that the law is not
actually advancing the government’s declared interests. In the
eyes of the majority, neither of
those problems was present
here. Nor did the Court find the
law troublingly overinclusive by
virtue of the fact that it barred
judicial candidates from person-
ally soliciting campaign contri-
butions by any means of com-
munication, from any person,
and in any amount. Strict
scrutiny does not demand “per-
fect tailoring,” Chief Justice
Roberts said, and he refused to
“wade into th[e] swamp” of try-
ing to distinguish between the
integrity-compromising effects of solicitations communicated
by one means rather than another, or sent to one group of
prospective donors rather than another, or seeking one amount
rather than another.
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia found Florida’s rule
“wildly disproportionate” to its “ill-defined interest” in pre-
serving the reality and appearance of judicial integrity.89 Justice
Scalia argued, for example, that it makes no sense to bar a judi-
cial candidate from seeking campaign contributions from close
friends and family members or from sending out mass solicita-
tions that do not “target any listener in particular.”90 Justice
Kennedy filed a separate dissent to underscore the importance
of protecting free speech in elections of all kinds, and Justice
Alito filed a dissent arguing that Florida’s law was “about as
narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.”91
As an entryway into the Court’s license-plate ruling in
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,92 Justice
Alito (again finding himself in dissent) proposed that you take
the following test. You are sitting near a roadway in Texas and,
as cars pass by, you see many specialty license plates. Some, for
example, say “I’d Rather Be Golfing,” some say “Roll, Tide,
Roll” (accompanied by the University of Alabama’s logo), some
say “Always One of a Kind” (accompanied by an image of a can
of Dr. Pepper), some say “Get It Sold with Re/Max (accompa-
nied by an image of that real-estate company’s famous bal-
loon), and so forth. Would you regard those messages as the
speech of the cars’ drivers or as the speech of the State of Texas
itself? The occasion for the thought experiment arose when
Texas refused to honor the Sons of Confederate Veterans’
request that the state issue a specialty license plate bearing that
non-profit organization’s name and logo, together with an
image of the Confederate flag.
Writing for the five-member majority (consisting of the
Court’s Democratic appointees and Justice Thomas), Justice
Breyer found that all Texas license plates—even plates whose
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messages and designs have been
proposed by the likes of golfers,
Alabama alumni, the manufac-
turer of Dr. Pepper, and
Re/Max—are Texas’s own gov-
ernmental speech and that the
First Amendment rules regard-
ing content- and viewpoint-
based discrimination thus do
not apply. The Court relied
heavily upon its 2009 ruling in
Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum,93 in which the justices
held that monuments in a
municipal park are government
speech even when they are
designed by private parties, and
that—without fear of First
Amendment liability—Pleasant
Grove City thus could decline
to erect a monument bearing a
religious organization’s core principles. Justice Breyer found
that specialty plates fall into the same category. Like monu-
ments, he said, states have commonly used license plates to
convey messages; Texas takes ownership of any privately pre-
pared license-plate designs that it adopts; and the state has
maintained control over which messages the plates convey.
Writing for the Court’s four dissenting members, Justice
Alito found it implausible that anyone would regard personal-
ized messages of the sort listed above as coming from the State
of Texas itself, a conclusion that he bolstered with an appendix
showing nearly 60 specialty plates that Texas has approved. In
his view, the state had created a limited public forum through
its specialty-plate program and thus could not commit view-
point discrimination when deciding which proposed messages
to accept.
The Court’s nine members all agreed on the appropriate
outcome in Reed v. Town of Gilbert;94 what divided them was
the best path to get there. The Town of Gilbert, Arizona, had
an elaborate sign ordinance that, on its face, plainly treated
signs differently based upon their content. Signs with “ideo-
logical” content could be up to 20 square feet and could be
posted indefinitely, for example, while a “temporary direc-
tional sign relating to a qualifying event” could be no more
than 6 square feet and had to be removed within one hour of
the advertised event’s conclusion. A small church that met in
alternating locations and relied heavily upon temporary direc-
tional signs challenged the ordinance, saying that it violated
the members’ First Amendment rights.
Joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Alito, and Sotomayor, Justice Thomas concluded that the ordi-
nance was indeed unconstitutional. Because the ordinance was
content-based on its face, Justice Thomas explained, it was
automatically subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the pur-
poses that drove the town to enact it. Even if the town’s prof-
fered purposes were compelling (namely, preserving the town’s
beauty and promoting traffic safety), the Court held that the
ordinance’s content distinctions were “hopelessly underinclu-
sive.” Temporary directional signs, for example, are no more or
less attractive or dangerous than many of the signs that the
town permitted to be larger and to be erected for longer peri-
ods. The Court thus found that the ordinance was not actually
serving the town’s articulated objectives. (Reed and Williams-
Yulee likely will be cited for years to come as the leading pair
of cases on underinclusiveness in free-speech analysis.)
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, Justice Alito
filed a concurring opinion aimed at assuring readers that,
through content-neutral sign regulations, cities will be able to
achieve their safety and aesthetic goals. Justice Breyer con-
curred in the judgment, arguing that strict scrutiny should not
automatically apply to all content-based speech regulations and
that—relying on content discrimination “as a rule of thumb”—
a court should instead ask “whether the regulation at issue
works harm to First Amendment interests that is dispropor-
tionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.”95 Joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Kagan similarly con-
curred in the judgment. She argued that the majority’s ruling
placed countless sign ordinances across the country in jeop-
ardy and that—rather than hold that strict scrutiny automati-
cally applies to all sign ordinances that make content distinc-
tions—the Court should simply have said that the town’s ordi-
nance “does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny,
or even the laugh test.”96
TAKINGS
Imagine you are a raisin grower. After you have harvested
your raisins each year, a large truck backs up to your facility at
the direction of the Department of Agriculture’s Raisin Admin-
istrative Committee and takes a portion of your crop (47 per-
cent of it in 2002-2003, less of it in others). Whether you are
paid anything at all for the seized raisins will depend on
whether there is any money left over after the Committee
deducts expenses that it incurs in selling or otherwise dispos-
ing of the raisins as part of its overall effort to maintain a sta-
ble raisin market. In some years, there will be no such funds
remaining; in some years, the funds you are paid will amount
to less than the costs you incurred to grow the raisins. Yet you
presumably derive benefits from the Committee’s effort to
maintain a healthy raisin market, and those benefits might be
substantial. One year, you dig in your heels and refuse to grant
the truck access to your crops, and in return the Department
of Agriculture fines you in an amount equal to the value of the
raisins you refused to hand over, plus an additional sum for
your disobedience. Has your property been taken, without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause? The Horne family found itself in that situation and
brought precisely that claim. And in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture,97 the Court ruled in favor of the Horne family.
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Writing for an eight-member majority (all except Justice
Sotomayor), Chief Justice Roberts first found that the govern-
ment’s duty to pay just compensation for physical takings
applies to takings of personal property and not just to real
property. Distinguishing between regulatory and physical tak-
ings, the Court could find nothing in the text or history of the
Fifth Amendment to indicate otherwise. The Chief Justice then
found that the fact that there had been a physical taking for
which just compensation was owed was not negated by the
Committee’s occasional payments to raisin growers of any net
proceeds or by the fact that raisin growers could simply grow
other crops if they did not wish to participate in the federal
raisin program.
In the most divisive part of the Court’s ruling—a part that
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan refused to join—the
majority refused to remand the case for a calculation that the
Government had argued was appropriate. The Government
had insisted that remand was needed to determine whether
just compensation was owed (and thus whether any Fifth
Amendment violation had actually occurred) because, it said,
the value of the benefits that the Hornes had derived from the
federal raisin program might well have exceeded the value of
the raisins that the Government wished to collect. The major-
ity declined to take that approach, however, finding instead
that the benefits of a regulatory program cannot themselves
constitute just compensation for a physical taking. Rather, just
compensation must be measured by the value of the physically
taken property itself. Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
Justice Breyer embraced the Government’s argument on this
point, finding that if the benefits of the federal raisin program
exceeded the value of the raisins taken, then there had been no
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
TAXATION
Those who have earned income in multiple states over the
course of a single year know that states commonly offer their
residents an income-tax credit for taxes paid to other states on
income earned in those other jurisdictions. Maryland chose
not to fully provide such a credit,98 and so residents like Brian
and Karen Wynne found themselves being taxed twice on the
same portion of their income. In Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne,99 the Court ruled 5-4 that Maryland’s taxa-
tion system violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, Justice Alito explained that, under the Court’s
precedents, the Constitution forbade Maryland from imple-
menting a system of taxation that treated interstate economic
activity less favorably than it treated economic activity within
its own borders. Applying the “internal consistency test,” the
Court asked whether interstate commerce would be disadvan-
taged, relative to intrastate commerce, if every state in the
Union adopted a taxation system
identical to Maryland’s.100 The
Court found that it would and that
Maryland’s system was thus indis-
tinguishable from a tariff.
Joined by Justices Scalia and
Kagan in dissent, Justice Ginsburg
argued that the majority’s ruling
robbed Maryland of its ability to
make a constitutionally permissi-
ble policy choice and that the
Wynnes’ remedy lay in their state’s
political processes. Joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas,
Justice Scalia wrote separately to underscore his skepticism
about much of the dormant Commerce Clause enterprise and
to argue that, while the “internal consistency test” might
resemble one formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical
imperative, it has no roots in the Constitution’s text or struc-
ture. In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas reiterated his previ-
ously announced willingness to abandon the dormant Com-
merce Clause altogether.
Meanwhile, to facilitate its own tax-collection efforts, Col-
orado enacted a law requiring retailers that do not themselves
collect Colorado sales and use taxes to notify consumers of
their state tax obligations and to provide the Colorado Depart-
ment of Revenue with periodic reports on the retailers’ trans-
actions with Colorado residents. The Direct Marketing Associ-
ation—a trade group that includes online retailers and others
who market their products directly to consumers—challenged
the law. They argued that, among other things, the law was
simply a device to evade Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,101 the
1992 case in which the Court held that retailers cannot be
compelled to collect sales taxes from customers in states with
which the retailers lack a “substantial nexus.” The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the Tax Injunction Act barred federal courts from
enjoining enforcement of the Colorado law. In Direct Market-
ing Association v. Brohl,102 the Court unanimously reversed,
finding that an order blocking Colorado’s notice and reporting
requirements would not (in the words of the Tax Injunction
Act) “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or col-
lection” of Colorado taxes.103
The retailers’ victory celebration was undoubtedly tempered
by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Acknowledging that the
issue was not now properly before the Court, Justice Kennedy
wrote separately to say that online retail sales have grown
stratospherically in the years since Quill was decided, that Quill
is “inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the States,” and
that the Court should find an opportunity to reconsider Quill’s
“doubtful authority.”104 Should the Court indeed abandon Quill
in a future case, online retailers might look back on Direct Mar-
keting Association as a brief and largely inconsequential victory.
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OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk,105 the Court held
that federal law does not require employers to pay employees
for the time they spend undergoing antitheft security screen-
ings at the end of their shifts.
In T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell,106 the Court ruled
that, when denying an application to build a cell-phone tower,
a locality must provide a written statement of the reasons for
the denial and—although the notification of the denial and the
statement of reasons need not appear in the same document—
the two must be provided “essentially contemporaneously”
with one another.107
Divided 5-4, the Court ruled in Michigan v. EPA108 that—
even though the EPA eventually conducted cost-benefit analy-
ses indicating that the benefits of regulating fossil-fuel-fired
power plants would easily justify the costs—the EPA erred by
not considering costs at all when initially determining whether
such regulation was (in the language of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990) “appropriate and necessary.”
The Court divided 5-4 on several issues in Alabama Legisla-
tive Black Caucus v. Alabama,109 including on whether the
plaintiffs had pled an Equal Protection Clause claim of district-
specific racial gerrymandering. A majority of the justices con-
cluded that they had. Led by Justice Scalia, the dissenters
accused the majority of “act[ing] as standby counsel for sym-
pathetic litigants” and of “invit[ing] lower courts similarly to
depart from the premise that ours is an adversarial system
whenever they deem the stakes sufficiently high.”110
Resolving a circuit split, the Court ruled unanimously in
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank111 that a bankruptcy court’s refusal to
confirm a debtor’s proposed repayment plan under Chapter 13
is not a final order that the debtor can immediately appeal as
of right, so long as the court’s order “leaves the debtor free to
propose another plan.”112
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees to
hire attorneys and other professionals to assist them with their
duties. In Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC,113 the Court held
that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a bankruptcy
court to award attorneys’ fees to those professionals for time
they spend defending their fee applications.
Drawing from the law of trusts, the Court held in Tibble v.
Edison International114 that the beneficiaries of a retirement plan
covered by ERISA may bring an action against their plan’s fidu-
ciaries for failure “to properly monitor investments and remove
imprudent ones,” so long as the alleged breach of that ongoing
fiduciary obligation occurred within the prior six years.115
In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,116 the Court refused
to abandon its 1964 ruling in Brulotte v. Thys Co.117 that a
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his or her
invention after the patent’s term has expired. Marvel Enter-
tainment was thus allowed to escape from a contract in which
it had agreed to pay royalties—apparently in perpetuity—to
the inventor of a toy that allows one to shoot foam from the
palm of one’s hand, à la Spider Man. And with that gift-shop-
ping idea, we bring this year’s Term summary to a close. 
LOOKING AHEAD
Among the headlines next Term will be the Court’s ruling in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,118 in which the justices
will return to the divisive topic of affirmative action in higher
education. Another attention-grabbing case will be Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Association,119 in which the Court will re-
examine whether public-sector employees can be compelled to
make financial contributions to unions (a question on which
some of the justices have recently expressed strong doubts, as
signaled by the “Doubting Abood” title of last year’s Term sum-
mary). Among the many other civil-law issues currently slated
for the justices’ attention are whether Indian tribal courts may
adjudicate tort claims against nonmembers,120 whether a state
can be sued in another state’s courts without its consent,121
whether the focus should be on total population or on voter
population when deploying the Equal Protection Clause’s “one
person, one vote” principle,122 the test for calculating the
statute of limitations in federal constructive-discharge
claims,123 the breadth of Congress’s power to confer standing
for claims of statutory violations,124 and the appropriate use of
statistical averages when evaluating whether class certification
is appropriate.125
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